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Abstract
Recent demographic literature shows in Swedish micro-level data a
positive e¤ect of female wage income or female education on fertility.
The literature explains this nding with Swedish family policies of high
subsidies for bought-in child care and generous parental leave benets
that are calculated on the basis of a womans prior wage income. Both
policies would cause the substitution e¤ect from an increase in female
wages on fertility to be dominated by its income e¤ect. This paper
shows within an economic model that there are o¤setting e¤ects from
Swedish family policy that cause the reduction in the magnitude of
the substitution e¤ect of female wages to be most likely rather small.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1960s the fertility rate (TFR) declined in OECD countries enor-
mously and threatens the future sustainability of the public pension system.
At the same time the female labour force participation rate (FLP) rose in
OECD countries. Galor and Weil (1996) present a general equilibrium model
in which an endogenously rising relative wage of women leads simultaneously
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to a decline in the TFR and a rise in the FLP. However, surpringly since the
late 1980s the OECD countries with the highest TFRs are also the OECD
countries with the highest FLPs. Among others, Esping-Anderson (1999),
Ahn and Mira (2002), Rindfuss et al. (2003), and Apps and Rees (2004)
have shown that the cross-country correlation between the TFR and the
FLP turned from a negative value before the late 1980s to a positive value
thereafter. To explain this reversal, Apps and Rees (2004) introduce to the
aforemention model of Galor and Weil subsidies for bought-in child care, cash
payments per child, and joint taxation of family income or taxation of each
individuals income. They show that countries with subsidies for bought-in
child care rather than cash payments per child and individual rather than
joint taxation are likely to have both, a higher TFR and a higher FLP.1 ;2
In Apps and Rees (2004) public policies only have a direct e¤ect on fer-
tility. The authors still maintain the common assumption in economics that
the female wage has a negative e¤ect on fertility. Recently, demographers
went further than Apps and Rees. Various recent studies by demographers
show in Swedish micro-level data that female wage income or female edu-
cation surprisingly have a positive e¤ect on fertility, in particular on second
and third order births.3 The demographic literature explains this nding
with Swedish family policies of high subsidies for bought-in child care and
generous parental leave benets that are calculated on the basis of a womans
prior wage income (henceforth income-replacement based parental leave ben-
1See Kögel (2006) for empirical evidence that cross-country di¤erences in use of bought-
in child care contribute to the positive cross-country correlation between the TFR and the
FLP across Western European countries.
2Martinez and Iza (2004) show model-theoretically that a positive association between
the TFR and the FLP can also be produced with a rising relative wage of skilled labour,
because bought-in child care is intensively produced with unskilled female labour. How-
ever, while a rising relative wage of skilled labour can be observed in the US and the UK,
the Western European countries with the highest TFRs and the highest FLPs, namely
Nordic countries and France, do not have a rising relative wage of skilled labour. In addi-
tion, Da Rocha and Fuster (2006) show model-theoretically that cross-country di¤erences
in unemployment rates can also produce a positive association between the TFR and the
FLP across OECD countries (see Ahn and Mira, 2002, Adsera, 2005, and Kögel, 2006, for
empirical evidence).
3The earliest studies that found a positive e¤ect of female wage income in Sweden
were Andersson (2000) and Hoem (2000). The positive e¤ect is shown to persists after
controlling for the male partners wage income in Duvander and Andersson (2003) and
Andersson et al. (2005). A positive e¤ect of female education was found in Hoem and
Hoem (1989), Hoem (1996), Berinde (1999), and Olah (2003).
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ets). It is argued that both policies would cause the substitution e¤ect from
an increase in female wages on fertilty to be dominated by its income e¤ect.
The logic behind this explanation follows a model of Ermisch (1989), who
shows that the possibility of bought-in child care reduces the e¤ect of female
wages on fertility. He shows that women with high wage income can a¤ord
more bought-in child care and that this reduces the magnitude of the sub-
stitution e¤ect for these women.4 The demographic literature argues that
Swedish family policy would, similarly to the presence of child care in Er-
mischs model, reduce the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect in Sweden.
The present study examines whether this presumption can be conrmed in
an economic model similarly to the models of Ermisch and Apps and Rees.
The empirical result of a positive e¤ect of female wage income or female
education has recently also been found in Norwegian and Finish micro-level
data.5 Norway and Finland have both similar generous income-replacement
parental-leave systems as Sweden (see Bruning and Plantenga, 1999). How-
ever, while the governments in both countries provide more extensive child
care subsidies than other industrialised countries, the child care system is not
as generous as in Sweden (see Björklund, 2006, p. 8). In addition, Finland
and recently also Norway introduced also child home care allowances for fam-
ilies that decide to rear their children at home after a shorter parental leave
instead of to use public day care places. This policy was not implemented in
Sweden, because in Sweden it is believed that a child home care allowances
could trap women permanently out of the labour force (see Hoem, 2005, p.
570). Because of these di¤erences in family policy, one would, contrary to
the empirical ndings in the literature, expect somewhat weaker evidence
for a positive e¤ect of female wage income or female education on fertility
in Norway and Finland than in Sweden. The positive e¤ect from female
wage income or female education on fertility has also been found in French,
British and West German micro-level data.6 This is very surprisingly, as
4Ermisch (1989) shows also empirical support for this result in British micro-level data.
5Evidence for a positive e¤ect of female education on third order births has been found
in Norwegian micro-level data by Kravdal (1992). In Finish micro-level data evidence for a
positive e¤ect of female wage income on rst order births has been found by Vikat (2004).
6Köppen (2004) nds a signicant and positive e¤ect of female education on second
order births in French micro-level data even after controlling for the male partners charac-
teristics. In contrast, after controlling for the male partners education the e¤ect of female
education was insignicant and positive in West German micro-level data. The latter re-
sult for West Germany was rst found in Kreyenfeld (2001). Kreyenfeld and Zabel (2005)
nd after controlling for the male partners education, the female employment status, and
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these countriesfamily policies di¤er substantial from Swedish family policy,
even more than those in other Nordic countries than Sweden. Hence, the
latter empirical results could be interpreted as evidence for an alternative
explanation given by Kravdal (2001), who argues that the positive e¤ect of
female education on third order births represents a selection e¤ect, as well
educated women who already have two children are a select group with high
preference for children. Kravdal nds evidence for his argument in Norwe-
gian micro-level data by showing that the e¤ect of female education on third
order births becomes negative and signicant, once he estimates the tran-
sitions to rst, second, and third child simultaneously and adds a common
unobserved heterogeneity factor (which is supposed to capture the selection
e¤ect).7 ;8
This paper shows within an economic model similarly to the models of
Apps and Rees (2004) and Ermisch (1989) that there are o¤setting e¤ects
from Swedish family policy that cause the reduction of the substitution e¤ect
from an increase in female wages on fertility to be most likely rather small.
It is shown that child care subsidies only unambiguously reduce the magni-
tude of the substitution e¤ect at the micro-level, if bought-in child care and
domestic child care are strong substitudes. In contrast, income-replacement
based parental leave benets only unambiguously reduce the magnitude of
the substitution e¤ect, if bought-in child care and domestic child care are
weak substitudes. At the macro-level the extent of substitutability between
bought-in child care and domestic child care is irrelevant and child care sub-
sidies and income-replacement based parental leave benets reduce both un-
ambiguously the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect. However, for each
female wage income a signicant and positive e¤ect of female education on second order
births in West German micro-level data. With the same control variables the authors nd
an insignicant and positive e¤ect of female education on second order births in British
micro-level data.
7Kreyenfeld (2001) shows the same result for West German micro-level data, using the
same estimation method as Kravdal.
8Another problem of the demographic literature is the fact that the underlying economic
models predict an e¤ect from the hourly female wage rate instead of from the annual
female wage income, which the demographic literature uses because of unavailability of
better micro-level data. Using data of hourly female wage rates, Heckman and Walker
(1990) nd a negative and signicant e¤ect of female wages on fertility in Swedish micro-
level data. However, Tasiran (1995, 2002) and Walker (2002) disagree on whether or not
the signicance of female wage rates is sensitive to Heckman and Walkers approximation
of micro-level wage data with macro-level wage data.
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family policy the reduction in the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect is at
the macro-level always smaller than at the micro-level, if the substitutabil-
ity between bought-in child care and domestic child care is such that the
e¤ect at the micro-level is unambiguous. In addition, the magnitude of the
substitution e¤ect itself is at the macro-level larger than at the micro level.
The bottom line of this is that Swedish public policy probably has a positive
direct e¤ect on the TFR and the FLP, as shown model-theoretically by Apps
and Rees (2004). However, demographers most likely went too far in arguing
that Swedish family policy also reversed the sign of the e¤ect of female wages
on fertility from a negative to a positive value.
The model in the next section is static, similarly to the models of Apps
and Rees (2004) and Ermisch (1989). Hence, the model does not capture an
e¤ect of the Swedish parental leave benets system that Andersson (2005)
argues to be relevant and important. He stresses that due to the fact that
parental leave benets are calculated on the basis of a womans prior wage
income, the Swedish parental leave system gives women an incentive to wait
with childbearing until they are established on the labour market with a de-
cent level of income. Only this would make them eligible for high parental
leave benets. He argues this incentive would explain the nding of a posi-
tive e¤ect of female wage income on fertility. The fact that the next sections
model abstracts from this e¤ect can be justied with the following argu-
ment: The incentive e¤ect stressed by Andersson does not imply that Swedish
women choose a high pay occupation, only in order to receive high parental
leave benets. Hence, it does not imply that high wage-type of women have
more children than low wage-type of women nor that an increase in the ag-
gregate female wage would cause an increased aggregate quantity of fertility.
Instead it only implies, as argued by Björklund (2006), that Swedish women
might postpone childbearing until they are established on the labour market.
However, evidently postponement of childbearing did not reduce the Swedish
aggregate quantity of fertility, as Swedish women sucessfully recuperated
with increased fertility at higher age for fertility forgone at earlier age (cf.
Lesthaeghe and Moors, 2000).9 For this reason, a dynamic model with the
9Postponement of childbearing did however reduce the TFR temporarily, because it
led to a "tempo e¤ect" that distorted downward the TFR as a measure of aggregate
quantity of fertility (see Bongaarts and Feeney, 1988). Nevertheless, this distortion will
only have been temporarily (see Sobotka, 2004) and, as is well known, even the downward
distorted Swedish TFR was in the 1990s high relative to the downward distorted TFR of
other Western European countries. In addition, the Swedish average TFR between 1995-
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possibility to examine changes in age of childbearing as, e.g., the model by
Walker (1995), while richer, would not improve the understanding of the ef-
fect of Swedish policy on the quantity of fertility of high wage-type of women
in comparison to low wage-type of women nor its inuence on the e¤ect of
an increase in the aggregate female wage on aggregate quantity of fertility.
To make his model tractable, Walker assumes in his dynamic model xed-
coe¢ cient technologies in the production of children to eliminate many
substitution possibilities. However, these substitution possibilities will turn
out to drive the results for the next sections model. For this reason, the
next sections model abstracts from dynamics of childbearing age in order to
examine the e¤ect of various substitution possibilities.
2 The Model
In the following model each household consists of a man and a women. Each
man supplies inelastically one unit time to the labour market, while each
women allocates one unit time between labour market participation and pro-
vision of domestic child care during parental leave. Home-centered women,
who provide domestic child care outside parental leave, are for simplicity ig-
nored. This seems not to be a problematic assumption, as in 1990 the labour
force participation rate of Swedish women of age 25-44 was about 90 % (see
Apps and Rees, 2004, Table 1). In the macoeconomy there is a single con-
sumption good. Following Galor and Weil (1986) and Apps and Rees (2004)
and without any inuence on the qualitative model results, I assume the
household utility function to be a Cobb-Douglas function as shown in (1.1)
in Table 1 (see the notations of the variables below the table). I also follow
these authors in abstracting from quality of children. All equations in the
model (except if indicated otherwise) can either refer to an individual house-
hold at the micro-level, where a household index is omitted for simplicity,
or to a representative household at the macro-level. In case of a macro-level
interpretation, the number of households is normalized to one.
In the rst-stage-optimisation problem each household maximises (1.1)
subject to the rst-stage-budget constraint (1.2) in Table 1. The left hand
side of (1.2) represents each households full-income, that is, the income that
2000 adjusted for this tempo distortion with a method of Bongaarts and Feeney (1988)
was higher than the TFR between 1995-2000 of most other Western European countries
adjusted for this tempo distortion with to the same method (cf. Sobotka, 2004).
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Table 1: Model assumptions
Household utility function U =  lnn+ (1  ) ln c; (1.1)
First-stage-budget constraint wm + wf   T = pnn+ c; (1.2)
Child production function n =

x
 1

z + x
 1

c
 
 1
;  > 0; (1.3)
Second-stage-budget constraint pnn = pxzxz + xc; (1.4)
Child care production function xz =

z
" 1
"
f + s
" 1
"
 "
" 1
; " > 0; (1.5)
Third-stage-budget constraint pxzxz = wf (1  ) zf + pss; (1.6)
ps = (1  )K ) @ps@wf
wf
ps
= 0; at the micro-level, (1.7)
ps = (1  ) wf ) @ps@wf
wf
ps
= 1; at the macro-level, (1.8)
Notation: Ut:household utility, n:number of children, c:household consump-
tion, : constant parameter, wm:male wage, wf :female wage, T :lump-sum
tax, pn:price index of children, xz:composite of child care, xc:quantity of the
consumption good used in the production of children, :elasticity of substi-
tution between the composite of child care and the consumption good in the
production of children, pxz :price index of child care, zf :quantity of domestic
child care, s:quantity of bought-in child care, ": elasticity of substitution
between bought-in child care and domestic child care, :income-replacement
rate of parental leave benets ps: price of bought-in child care, : child care
subsidy, K:a constant, :female labour unit requirement in production of
bought-in child care.
each couple would receive, if it supplied all its time endowments to the labour
market. The price of the consumption good is normalized to one. The rst-
stage-optimisation problem gives rise to the demand of children as shown in
(2.1) in Table 2. It should be noted that it is for simplicity assumed that
child care subsidies and parental leave benets are nanced with a lump-
sum tax T . This allows to abstract from feedback e¤ects on fertility from
wage income taxation to nance family policy. Apps and Rees (2004) show
that a negative e¤ect on fertility from wage income taxation to nance cash
payments per child does not dominate the e¤ects from the cash payments
per child itself, if the elasticity of domestic child care with repect to the
wage income tax rate to nance the cash payments is relatively small. The
latter is in Sweden fullled because the share of expenditures for family cash
benets and family services, such as child care subsidies, in total governments
expenditures is even in Sweden relatively small.10
10In Sweden the share of expenditures for family benets in GDP in 1995 was 3.85%
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Table 2: Results from household optimisation problems
Demand for children n = p 1n  (wm + wf   T ) ; (2.1)
Price index of children pn =
 
p1 xz + 1
 1
1  ; (2.2)
Budget share of child care pxzxz
pnn
=
p1 Xz
p1 xz +1
; (2.3)
Price index of child care pxz =

[wf (1  )]1 " + [pS]1 "
	 1
1 " ; (2.4)
Budget share of domestic child care wf (1 )zf
pxzxz
=
[wf (1 )]1 "
[wf (1 )]1 "+[pS ]1 "
: (2.5)
Budget share of bought-in child care pss
pxzxz
= [pS ]
1 "
[wf (1 )]1 "+[pS ]1 "
: (2.6)
Following Ermisch (1989) children are producedby combining input of
a composite of child care and input of the consumption good. In order to
derive closed form solutions, the children production functionis assumed
to be a CES function. In the second-stage-optimisation problem each house-
hold maximises (1.3) subject to the second-stage-budget constraint (1.4) in
Table 1. Table 2 shows the resulting price index of children (2.2) and the
resulting share of total child care cost in total expenditures for children (2.3).
The appendix contains a derivation of (2.2) and (2.3).11 For the children
production functionthe following undoubtly realistic assumption is made:
Assumption 1:  < 1 (i.e. child care and the consumption good are weak
subsitutes in the production of children).
Following Apps and Rees and Ermisch, child care is produced by combin-
ing domestic child care with bought-in child care. In order to derive closed
form solutions, also the child care production functionis assumed to be a
CES function. For simplicity it is abstracted from discrete choice of female
labour market participation. In the third-stage-optimisation problem each
household maximises (1.5) subject to the third-stage-budget constraint (1.6)
- 2.13 % for family cash benets, such as parental leave benets, and 1.72 % for family
services, such as child care subsidies - (data source: Country report for Sweden in "Inter-
national Reform Monitor" in Bertelsmann Foundation, 2006). In the same year, Swedens
share of total government expenditures in GDP was 67.7 % (data source: "Economic Free-
dom of the World: 1997 Annual report" in Fraser Institute, 1997). Hence, in Sweden in
1995 the share of expenditures for family policy in total governments expenditures was
with 5.69 % relatively small.
11If we had assumed the consumption good price to equal pc 6= 1, then we would have
had pn =
 
p1 xz + p
1 
c
 1
1  instead of (2.2).
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in Table 1. Table 2 shows the resulting price index of the composite of child
care (2.4) and the resulting budget share of domestic child care in total child
care cost (2.5), repectively, the resulting budget share of bought-in child care
in total child care cost (2.6). The derviation of (2.4)-(2.6) is similar to the
derivation of (2.2) and (2.3), which - as was already mentioned - is shown
in the appendix. In Sweden parents are entitled to 360 days per child of
income-replacement based parental leave benets. Of these 360 days one
parent, mostly the mother, is entitled to 330 days at most, while 30 days are
reserved for the other parent if used. Parents are additionally entitled to 90
days parental leave with at xed rate of 60 SEK (about 6.7 EUR) per day.
Swedish mothers who were entitled to parental leave in 1993-1998 took on
average slightly more than 40 weeks parental leave with a single peaked dis-
tribution over all women of the chosen duration of parental leave (Swedish
fathers took on average about 4 weeks parentel leave during this time pe-
riod).By far most women did not take more than the maximum of 330 days,
for which they were entitled to income-replacement based parental leave ben-
ets.12 For this reason, in the third-stage-budget constraint (1.6) in Table 1,
the possibility to take parental leave after 330 days is for simplicity ignored.
Instead, it is assumed that income-replacement based parental leave benets
reduce for all women the opportunity cost from foregone female wage income
by the rate :13
Finally, in Table 1 eq. (1.7), respectively, eq. (1.8) show the determinants
of the price of bought-in child care and an elasticity of the change of the price
of bought-in child care from an increase in the female wage at the micro-level,
respectively, at the macro-level. Obviously, in both cases the price of bought-
in child care is decresasing in the child care subsidy. Also crucial for the
results of the present study, (1.7) shows that the price of bought-in child care
is at the micro-level given for each women, implying that a rise of a womans
wage has no e¤ect on the price of bought-in childcare. As a consequence,
women with di¤erent wages pay the same price of bought-in child care and
12The source of the mentioned institutional details of the Swedish parental leave system
is Pylkkänen and Smith (2003).
13After 1980 in Sweden  had a value of 90 % (cf. Gustafsson and Sta¤ord, 1995, p. 168).
In the 1990s it has been reduced to its current value of 80 %, while it was in a temporary
interim period 75 % (cf. Andersson et al., 2004, p. 407). Hoem and Hoem (1996, 1999)
and Andersson (1999) argue that the reduction of  and simultaneous reductions in the
levels of child care allowances were responsible for some of a decline of Swedens TFR in
the 1990s.
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the higher the wage of a woman, the more bought-in child care the woman
can a¤ord.14 In constrast, (1.8) shows that at the macro-level an increase
in the female wage increases the price for bought-in child care. Without
any inuence on the qualitative model results, following Martinez and Iza
(2004), it is for simplicity assumed that female labour is the only input into
the production of bought-in child care. For this reason, an increase in the
aggregate female wage leads to an increase in the price for bought-in child
care by the same proportion. This implies that at the macro-level bought-in
child care does not become more a¤ordable, as the aggregate female wage
increases. Note also, that assuming government investment in availability
of a¤ordable child care instead of child care subsidies would give the same
qualitative model results.
3 Results
This section examines the interaction e¤ects between Swedish family policy
and the e¤ect of female wages on fertility. For this reason, it is rst necessary
to derive a mathematical expression for the e¤ect of female wages on fertility.
From (2.1) in Table 2 one can calculate the elasticity (@n=@wf ) (wf=n) as
@n
@wf
wf
n
=
wf
wm + wf   T  
@pn
@wf
wf
pn
; (1)
where the rst term on the right hand side of (1) is the income e¤ect from a
rise in the female wage, while the second term on the right hand side is its
substitution e¤ect. From (2.2) and use of (2.3) in Table 2 one can calculate
the substitution e¤ect (@pn=@wf ) (wf=pn) as
@pn
@wf
wf
pn
=

pxzxz
pnn

@pxz
@wf
wf
pxz
: (2)
14In reality, in Sweden the lowest income families pay child care fees of only 3-4 % of
the total cost of child care, while families at the highest income levels pay fees of up to 40
% of the total cost (cf. Gustafsson and Sta¤ord, 1995, p. 168). Following Apps and Rees,
this feature is for simplicity ignored in the model, as it would only strengthen the model
result of a weak reduction of the magnitude of the substition e¤ect from Swedish family
policy. In addition, for a child to get a child care place in Sweden each parent must at
least participate 20 hours per week in the labour markey or spend this time studying (cf.
Gustafsson and Sta¤ord, 1995, p. 167). In the model home-centered women are ignored.
Nevertheless, this policy might to a slight extent o¤set the e¤ect from lower child care fees
for lower income families.
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From (2.4) and use of (2.5), and (2.6) in Table 2 one can calculate the elas-
ticity (@pxz=@wf ) (wf=pxz) as:
@pxz
@wf
wf
pxz
=
wf (1  ) zf
pxzxz
+

pss
pxzxz

@ps
@wf
wf
ps
: (3)
Combining (1)-(3) yields
@n
@wf
wf
n
=
wf
wm + wf   T  

pxzxz
pnn

wf (1  ) zf
pxzxz
+

pss
pxzxz

@ps
@wf
wf
ps

:
(4)
Finally, using in (4), (1.7), and (1.8) in Table 1 gives
@n
@wf
wf
n
=
wf
wm + wf   T  

pxzxz
pnn

wf (1  ) zf
pxzxz

; at the micro-level,
(5)
@n
@wf
wf
n
=
wf
wm + wf   T  

pxzxz
pnn

; at the macro-level. (6)
Eq. (5) shows that, at the micro-level, the magnitude of the substitution
e¤ect of an increase in the female wage on fertility (henceforth the magnitude
of the substitution e¤ect) equals the product of the share of total child care
cost in total expenditures for children and the budget share of domestic child
care in total child care cost. Eq. (6) shows that, at the macro-level, the
magnitude of the substitution e¤ect equals only the share of total child care
cost in total expenditures for children. Hence, it is independent of the budget
share of domestic child care in total child care cost. This is due to the fact
that provision of bought-in child care requires input of female labour. As
a consequence, an increase in the aggregate female wage increases not only
the opportunity cost of domestic child care, but also the price of bought-
in child care.15 As a consequence, at the macro-level the magnitude of the
substitution e¤ect depends on the sum of the budget share of domestic child
15Ermisch (2003, Ch. 6) also argues in a discussion of the model of Ermisch (1989) that,
at the macro-level over time, an increase in the female wage increases the price of bought-
in child care and hence does not make bought-in child care relatively more a¤ordable
than domestic child care. It should be noted, however, that this holds not only at the
macro-level over time, but also at the macro-level across countries.
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care in total child care cost and the budget share of bought-in child care in
total child care cost, which of course equals one. Since the budget share of
domestic child care in total child care cost is smaller than one, this implies:
Proposition 1. The magnitude of the substitution e¤ect of an increase in the
female wage on fertility is at the macro-level larger than at the micro level.
Hence, at the macro-level a positive e¤ect of the female wage on fertility is
less likely than at the micro-level.
Next, it is examined whether or not a child care subsidy reduces the
magnitude of the substitution e¤ect. If so, then this would make it more
likely that there is a positive sign of the expressions on the right hand sides
of (5) and (6). This would contribute to a theoretical explanation of the
empirical nding of a positive e¤ect of female wages on fertility in Swedish
micro-level data. For the absolute value of the substitution e¤ect in (5),
jSEj, one can calculate upon use of (2.3), (2.5), and (2.6) in Table 2
@ jSEj
@

jSEj = (1  )

xc
pnn

@pxz
@

pxz
(7)
  (1  ")

pss
pxzxz

@ps
@

ps
; at the micro-level.
From (2.4) and use of (2.6) in Table 2 follows
@pxz
@

pxz
=

pss
pxzxz

@ps
@

ps
; (8)
while from (1.7) in Table 1 follows
@ps
@

ps
=  


1  

: (9)
Combining (7)-(9) gives
@ jSEj
@

jSEj =   (1  )

xc
pnn


1  

(10)
+(1  ")

pss
pxzxz


1  

; at the micro-level.
12
Since according to Assumption 1,  < 1, the right hand side of (10) is un-
ambiguously negative if "  1. However, the sign of the right hand side is
ambiguous if " < 1. This gives rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Provided fulllment of Assumption 1, at the micro-level, a
child care subsidy unambiguously reduces the magnitude of the substitution
e¤ect if "  1 (i.e. if bought-in child care and domestic child care are strong
substitudes). It has an ambiguous e¤ect on the magnitude of the substitution
e¤ect if " < 1 (i.e. if bought-in child care and domestic child care are weak
substitudes).
For the absolute value of the substitution e¤ect in (6), one can calculate
upon use of (2.3) in Table 2
@ jSEj
@

jSEj = (1  )

xc
pnn

@pxz
@

pxz
; at the macro-level. (11)
Combining (11) with (8) and (9) yields
@ jSEj
@

jSEj =   (1  )

xc
pnn


1  

; at the macro-level. (12)
Since the right hand side of (12) is unambiguously negative for  < 1, this
and a comparison of (12) with (10) gives the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Provided fulllment of Assumption 1, at the macro-level,
a child care subsidy unambiguously reduces the magnitude of the substitu-
tion e¤ect. However, the reduction is at the macro-level smaller than at the
micro-level if "  1 (i.e. if a child care subsidy unambiguously reduces the
magnitude of the substitution e¤ect at the micro-level).
Next, it is examined whether or not income-replacement based parental
leave benets reduce the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect. Again, this
a¤ects the likelihood of a positive sign of the expressions on the right hand
sides of (5) and (6). Again, this could contribute to a theoretical explanation
of the empirical nding of a positive e¤ect of female wages on fertility in
Swedish micro-level data. For the absolute value of the substitution e¤ect in
(5), one can calculate again upon use of (2.3), (2.5), and (2.6) in Table 2
13
@ jSEj
@

jSEj = (1  )

xc
pnn

@pxz
@

pxz
(13)
  (1  ")

pss
pxzxz


1  

; at the micro-level.
From (2.4) and use of (2.5) in Table 2 follows
@pxz
@

pxz
=  

wf (1  ) zf
pxzxz


1  

: (14)
Substituting (14) in (13) gives
@ jSEj
@

jSEj =   (1  )

xc
pnn

wf (1  ) zf
pxzxz


1  

(15)
  (1  ")

pss
pxzxz


1  

; at the micro-level.
The right hand side of (15) is only unambiguously negative if "  1. This
gives rise to the Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Provided fulllment of Assumption 1, at the micro-level,
income-replacement based parental leave benets have an ambiguous e¤ect
on the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect if " > 1 (i.e. if bought-in child
care and domestic child care are strong substitudes). They unambiguously
reduce the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect if "  1 (i.e. if bought-in
child care and domestic child care are weak substitudes).
For the absolute value of the substitution e¤ect in (6), one can calculate
again upon use of (2.3) in Table 2
@ jSEj
@

jSEj = (1  )

xc
pnn

@pxz
@

pxz
; at the macro-level. (16)
Substituting (14) in (16) yields
@ jSEj
@

jSEj =   (1  )

xc
pnn

wf (1  ) zf
pxzxz


1  

; at the macro-level.
(17)
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Since the right hand side of (17) is unambiguously negative, this and a com-
parison of (17) with (15) gives the last proposition of this study as follows:
Proposition 5. Provided fulllment of Assumption 1, at the macro-level,
income-replacement based parental leave benets unambiguously reduces the
magnitude of the substitution e¤ect. However, the reduction is at the macro-
level smaller than at the micro-level if "  1 (i.e. if income-replacement based
parental leave benets unambiguously reduce the magnitude of the substitution
e¤ect at the micro-level).
The bottom line of Propositions 2 and 4 is that, at the micro-level, the
reduction of the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect from Swedish family
policy is overall most likely rather small. On the one hand, if bought-in child
care and domestic child care are strong substitudes, then a child care subsidy
reduces unambiguously the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect. However, in
this case income-replacement based parental leave benets have an ambigu-
ous e¤ect on the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect. On the other hand,
if bought-in child care and domestic child care are weak substitudes, then
income-replacement based parental leave benets unambiguously reduce the
magnitude of the substitution e¤ect. However, in this case a child care sub-
sidy has an ambiguous e¤ect on the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect. As
a consequence, it seems, at the micro-level, unlikely that the recent empirical
nding in the demographic literature of a positive e¤ect of female wages on
fertility is realrather than due to some empirical problems (e.g., due to the
aforementioned selection e¤ect, as argued by Kravdal, 2001). The bottom
line of Propositions 3 and 5 is that, at the macro-level, Swedish family policy
unambiguously reduces the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect. However,
for each of the two family policies the e¤ect at the macro-level is smaller than
at the micro level, if the substitutability between bought-in child care and
domestic child care is such that the e¤ect at the micro-level is unambiguous.
Since in addition, according to Proposition 1, the magnitude of the substitu-
tion e¤ect is at the macro-level larger than at the micro level, it seems also
at the macro-level unlikely that in Sweden an increase in the female wage
has a positive e¤ect on fertility.
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4 Summary
Recent demographic literature shows in Swedish micro-level data a positive
e¤ect of female wage income or female education on fertility. The litera-
ture explains this nding with Swedish family policies of high subsidies for
bought-in child care and generous parental leave benets that are calculated
on the basis of a womans prior wage income. Both policies would cause the
substitution e¤ect from an increase in female wages on fertilty to be domi-
nated by its income e¤ect. This paper shows within an economic model that
there are o¤setting e¤ects from Swedish family policy that cause the reduc-
tion of the substitution e¤ect from an increase in female wages on fertility to
be most likely rather small.
It is shown that child care subsidies only unambiguously reduce the mag-
nitude of the substitution e¤ect at the micro-level, if bought-in child care
and domestic child care are strong substitudes. In contrast, parental leave
benets that are calculated on the basis of a womans prior wage income only
unambiguously reduce the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect, if bought-in
child care and domestic child care are weak substitudes. This is caused by
the fact that the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect depends positively on
the budget share of domestic child care in total child care cost. Further, child
care subsidies make bought-in child care more a¤ordable relative to domestic
child care. In contrast, parental leave benets that are calculated on the ba-
sis of a womans prior wage income make domestic child care more a¤ordable
relative to bought-in child care. Hence, the budget share of domestic child
care in total child care cost is inuenced from a change of the price of bought-
in child care relative to the opportunity cost of domestic child care. Whether
it rises or falls depends on the substitutability between bought-in child care
and domestic child care. Since therefore only one of the two Swedish family
policies can unambiguously reduce the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect,
it seems rather unlikely that, at the micro-level, in Sweden the e¤ect from
an increase in female wages on fertility is positive.
At the macro-level the substitutability between bought-in child care and
domestic child care is irrrelevant and child care subsidies and parental leave
benets both unambiguously reduce the substitution e¤ect. However, for
each family policy the e¤ect at the macro-level is smaller than at the micro-
level, if the substitutability between bought-in child care and domestic child
care is such that the e¤ect at the micro-level is an unambiguous. The reason
for this is the facts that provision of bought-in child care requires input of
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female labour. Therefore, an increase in the aggregate female wage increases
not only the opportunity cost of domestic child care, but also the price of
bought-in child care. As a consequence, at the macro-level the magnitude of
the substitution e¤ect depends on the sum of the budget share of domestic
child care in total child care cost and the budget share of bought-in child
care in total child care cost, which of course equals one. Therefore, at the
macro-level the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect is independent of the
price of bought-in child care relative to the opportunity cost of domestic
child care. In contrast, at the micro-level the magnitude of the substitution
e¤ect depends only on the budget share of domestic child care in total child
care cost, because at the micro-level the price of bought in child care is given
for each woman. For this reason, at the macro-level the magnitude of the
substitution e¤ect does dependent on the price of bought-in child care relative
to the opportunity cost of domestic child care. In addition, the fact that at
the macro-level the magnitude of the substitution e¤ect depends on the sum
of the budget shares of domestic child care and bought-in child care in total
child care cost, while at the micro-level it depends only on the budget share
of domestic child care in total child care cost, implies that the magnitude
of the substitution e¤ect itself is at the macro-level larger than at the micro
level. As a consequence, it seems also at the macro-level unlikely that in
Sweden an increase in the female wage has a positive e¤ect on fertility.
The present study does not deny that Swedish family policy probably has
a positive direct e¤ect on the TFR and the FLP, as shown model-theoretically
by Apps and Rees (2004). However, it is argued that demographers most
likely went too far in arguing that Swedish family policy also reversed the
sign of the e¤ect from female wages on fertility from a negative to a positive
value.
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Appendix: Derivation of (2.2) and (2.3) in Table 2
Maximisation of (1.3) in Table 1 n =

x
 1

z + x
 1

c
 
 1
subject to the con-
straint (1.4) in Table 1 pnn = pxzxz + xc yields
xz = p
 
xz xc ^ xc = pxzxz (18)
Combining the rst, respectively, the second equation in (18) with the budget
constraint (1.4) in Table 1 gives
xc =

1
p1 xz + 1

pnn; (19)
xz =

p xz
p1 xz + 1

pnn: (20)
Multiplying both sides of (20) with pxz yields (2.3) in Table 2. Substituting
(19) and (20) in (1.3) in Table 1 and rearranging gives rise to (2.3) in Table
2.
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